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Abstract 
We analyze the takeover premiums paid for a sample of European bank mergers between 
1997 and 2007. We find that acquiring banks value profitable, high-growth and low risk 
targets. We also find that the strength of bank regulation and supervision as well as deposit 
insurance regimes in Europe have measurable effects on takeover pricing. Stricter bank 
regulatory regimes and stronger deposit insurance schemes lower the takeover premiums 
paid by acquiring banks. This result, presumably in anticipation of higher compliance costs, 
is mainly driven by domestic deals. Also, we find no conclusive evidence that bidders seek to 
extract benefits from regulators either by paying a premium for deals in less regulated 
regimes or by becoming ‘too big to fail’. 
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1 Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to examine one aspect of the bank takeover process, the 
premiums paid in bank takeovers in the EU-25 (before the last enlargement) between 1997 
and 20071. While the literature recognizes the importance of U.S. bank takeovers, far less 
attention has been given to takeovers in the European Union (EU).2
 The relative lack of attention to EU takeovers is also unfortunate because the EU 
provides greater diversity of banking and securities laws than the U.S. which allows the 
testing of hypotheses which cannot be tested with U.S. data. One important area where the 
EU allows substantial differences is in the areas of prudential supervision and deposit 
insurance. The EU directives set minimum standards to harmonize some aspects of bank 
prudential regulation and deposit insurance. However, the discretion given to member states 
in implementing these directives raises the possibility that the remaining cross-border 
differences may influence bank takeovers. 
 This is unfortunate 
because the EU is trying to promote cross-border takeovers as a way of developing a single 
market in financial services, a goal which received added impetus from the adoption of the 
Euro throughout much of the EU and which remains unchanged by the recent banking crisis. 
Attaining this goal requires the growth of cross-border banks because the financial systems of 
most EU countries are bank-based. The European Commission has expressed concern with 
the slow pace and size of cross-border takeovers, especially relative to domestic takeovers as 
discussed in Hernando, Nieto and Wall (2009). By analyzing bank takeover pricing in the EU, 
we are able to shed some light on the motives which acquiring banks link to acquisitions. 
 Similarly in the areas of corporate governance and takeover law, the EU sets some 
broad standards but important differences remain across member states. Some of these 
rules relate to the protection afforded to shareholders.  For example, Hagendorff, Collins and 
Keasey (2008) show that variations in sharehlder protections have a significant impact on 
bidding banks’ stock returns around the takeover announcement. Another important 
difference relates to the acquisition process. In the vast majority of U.S. acquisitions, the 
acquirer’s ownership goes from less than 5 percent of a U.S. target bank’s shares to 100 
percent of the target upon consummation of the merger due to federal banking and securities 
regulations. In contrast, staggered acquisitions in which the acquirer purchases shares in a 
series of transactions are much more common in Europe, especially in the financial sector 
[European Commission (2005)]. 
Our sample of bank mergers includes both domestic and cross-border mergers in 
the EU-25 between 1997 and 2007. Targets include both listed banks and non-listed banks. 
Along with a general analysis of takeovers that may provide insights useful in building a single 
market for financial services in the EU, this paper provides evidence on the valuation effects of 
safety nets, shareholder protection as well as some aspects of takeover legislation in the 
context of bank mergers. 
                                                                            
1. Other possible dimensions for European bank mergers include: (1) the wealth implications for shareholders 
[Cybo-Ottone and Murcia (2000); Hagendorff, Collins and Keasey (2008); Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009)], (2) the long-run 
performance following bank M&A [Diaz et al. (2004); Campa and Hernando (2006); Hagendorff and Keasey (2009)], 
and (3) the determinants which make banks takeover targets [Hernando, Nieto and Wall (2009)]. 
2. For an overview of the European banking literature, see Berglöf, Fulghieri, Gual, Mayer, Barros and Vives (2005) 
and Goddard, Molyneux, Wilson and Tavakoli (2007). 
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The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief informal model 
of the determinants of the prices paid in bank takeovers and applies this informal model to a 
review of the existing literature and develops testable hypotheses. The third section reviews 
the data and empirical model. The fourth and fifth sections present the univariate and 
multivariate empirical analysis, respectively. The paper concludes with a review and policy 
implications. 
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2 Literature Review and Testable Implications 
Table 1 summarizes a number of studies of bank takeover pricing in terms of their sample 
selection criteria and whether they value takeovers using pre-takeover book values or market 
values of the target institution.3
The next subsection provides a brief informal model of bank takeover pricing. 
The following subsections apply that model to evaluate the existing literature on the 
determinants of bank takeover prices. 
 The only study we are aware of which specifically focuses on 
Europe is Díaz and Azofra (2009). However, unlike our study, Díaz and Azofra (2009) include 
bank mergers only up to 2000 and do not consider any implications linked to the government 
regulation of banks. 
2.1 An Informal Model of Bank Takeover Pricing 
The starting point in valuing a bank to another bank acquirer is the existing value of the bank 
based on its current profitability, its risk and its likely growth based on its recent experience. 
A bank acquirer must also evaluate how assuming control of the target is likely to change the 
target bank’s value. These changes in value arise both from changes intrinsic to the business 
due to the change in control and changes in the external environment that are unique to 
banking — in particular, changes in the combined banks’ exposure to prudential supervision 
and coverage by the safety net. 
The valuation effects of bank M&A may also depend upon the rules regarding 
the corporate governance of the target and the takeover process. Rules that strengthen the 
protection of the target bank’s shareholders increase the share of the target’s profits going to 
the shareholders and, hence, their takeover reservation price. Rules related to the takeover 
process may also be important in an environment with staggered takeovers. Absent such 
rules, the acquirer may pay a premium to a few shareholders to obtain effective control 
and then use such control to squeeze the other shareholders into selling at a lower price 
[see Nenova (2006)].4
2.2 Current Profitability and Risk 
 
Almost all empirical analyses of takeover pricing follow theory by including a profitability 
measure as a proxy for the target’s expected cash flow as an explanatory variable. Target 
profitability is typically proxied by the target’s return on assets, and, as predicted by theory, 
the coefficient on it is generally significantly positive.5
                                                                            
3. The dependent variable in almost all papers is some variation on the ratio of the merger price divided by the 
target’s pre-merger value, where pre-merger value is either its pre-announcement accounting (book) value or its 
pre-announcement market value. However, some papers estimate the merger price with either the pre-merger book 
or market value as a control variable. 
 
4. Prior studies have also considered other hypotheses that are either not relevant to the EU or not testable for our 
sample of banks.  An example of a hypothesis that is not relevant to this paper is Adkisson and Fraser’s (1990) inclusion 
of a binary variable for restrictions on intrastate takeovers that existed during for its sample. A common set of 
hypotheses that are not testable with the available data for this paper’s sample relate to the board and ownership 
structure of the target and sometimes also that of the acquirer. Papers including measures of these structures include 
Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani (2000), Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani (2007), and Palia (1993). 
5. Studies that found a positive coefficient on their measure of profitability include Adkisson and Fraser (1990), 
Beatty, Santomero and Smirlock (1987), Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani (2000), Cheng, Gup and Wall (1989), Díaz and 
Azofra (2009), Palia (1993), and Shawky, Kilb and Staas (1996). Rogowski and Simons (1989) estimate an insignificant 
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Many studies of takeover price do not include a risk term. Those studies that do 
include such terms often follow Benston, Hunter and Wall (1995) in analyzing whether 
acquirers pay more for banks that would reduce the combined firm’s overall risk 
(diversification hypothesis) or more for banks that would increase the value of the government 
safety net to the combined firm (deposit insurance put hypothesis). The diversification 
hypothesis predicts that acquirers will pay less for targets with high variance of own 
profitability and high covariance with the acquirer’s profitability. The deposit insurance put 
hypothesis predicts that acquirers will pay more for targets with high variance and high 
covariance.  Benston, Hunter and Wall (1995) and  Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani (2000) find 
support for the diversification hypothesis with significant negative coefficients on the variance 
of the target’s ROE and insignificant coefficients on the covariance of the target and 
acquirer’s ROE. Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani (2007) report different results, but where 
significant, the coefficients on the target’s variance of ROA and covariance also support the 
diversification hypothesis.6
 A related strand of literature has analyzed the type of mergers that appear to create 
more value for the shareholders of the merging companies. A common result is that focusing 
mergers usually generate larger returns than diversifying transactions [see DeLong (2001) and 
Beitel et al. (2004)]. Thus, bidders might be willing to pay higher premiums in non-diversifying 
deals as they are potentially more value creating. 
 By contrast, Carbó et al. (2009), using a sample of European 
banks that undertook cross-border M&A activity, find that these banks were responding 
principally to opportunities for shifting risk onto EU safety nets, what would be consistent with 
the deposit insurance put hypothesis. 
2.3 Changes in Profitability Post Acquisition 
Along with the historic profitability of the target, acquirers also value opportunities to grow the 
target’s profits. One source of profit growth is the asset growth rate of the target bank. 
A common proxy for the potential future growth rate of the target is its historical growth rate. 
Cheng, Gup and Wall (1989) obtain a positive coefficient on core deposit growth and on asset 
growth in many of their specifications. However, Brewer and Jagtiani (2007) obtain negative, 
often significant coefficients in a model estimating premium over market value.  One way to 
reconcile these seemingly contradictory results is that a premium for growth may already 
be priced into the targets’ stock price and acquirers’ are not expected to increase this 
growth rate. The coefficients on the target asset growth rate in Díaz and Azofra (2009) and in 
Palia (1993) are insignificant. 
Higher levels of target bank capital provide some benefits to acquirers in that it 
allows acquirers to grow without a capital contribution from the acquirer while continuing 
to pay dividends. On the other hand, higher levels of capital also mean a greater value of 
shares must be acquired which would dilute the premium paid per share. Although the 
literature finds mixed results for the level of capital, the more common result of a negative 
coefficient supports the premium dilution hypothesis. A significantly positive coefficient on 
capital is found in the model estimated by Adkisson and Fraser (1990). Significantly negative 
coefficients are estimated in Beatty, Santomero and Smirlock (1987), Díaz and Azofra (2009), 
Hakes, Brown and Rappaport (1997), Rogowski and Simonson (1989), Shawky, Kilb and 
Staas (1996), and in most of the models estimated in Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani (2007). 
The estimated coefficient is insignificant in Palia (1993). 
                                                                                                                                                 
coefficient on return on equity when the dependent variable is the purchase price to book ratio, but obtain 
a significant positive coefficient when the dependent variable is the purchase price premium to deposits ratio. 
6. Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani (2007) find that the coefficient on the covariance is significantly negative when it is 
interacted with a binary variable that takes a value of one when both the acquirer and target are ‘too-big-to-fail’. 
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Another source of profitability and potential growth in profitability is the degree 
of market concentration in the target’s market. More concentrated markets may offer 
greater opportunities to increase profits.7
Cross-border acquisitions offer opportunities to both increase and decrease the 
profitability of the target. The opportunity to increase the profitability comes from the potential 
for the acquirer to take innovations in its home market and bring them to the acquirer’s 
market. However, cross-border mergers limit the scope for cost savings (e.g. by saving on 
duplicate branch networks) and increase the possibility that the acquirer will make cultural 
or legal mistakes in its management and marketing of the target bank after the acquisition. 
 Beatty, Santomero and Smirlock (1987) obtain a 
positive coefficient on the Herfindahl index of the target’s markets and Palia (1993) find that 
the coefficient on the four firm concentration ratio in the target’s state is significantly positive 
in a model estimating the book value premium. However, the coefficient on the four-firm 
concentration ratio of the target state in Hakes, Brown and Rappaport (1997) is insignificant 
as is the Herfindahl index in Rogowski and Simonson (1989) and in Díaz and Azofra (2009). 
‘Cross-border’ takeovers in a U.S. context are takeovers across state boundary 
lines. As the differences between U.S. states are generally smaller than those between EU 
member states, cross-border acquisitions in the U.S. arguably offer both smaller potential 
benefits and costs. Palia (1993), Rogowski and Simonson (1989) and Shawky, Kilb and 
Staas (1996) estimate a significantly positive coefficient on interstate banking whereas 
Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani (2000) obtain significantly negative coefficients. The estimated 
coefficient for cross-border takeovers is insignificant in Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani (2007) 
and Hakes, Brown and Rappaport (1997). The coefficients on a binary variable for 
cross-border takeovers in Europe estimated by Díaz and Azofra (2009) in various models are 
consistently insignificant. 
One of the costs of a takeover is that of integrating the target bank into the acquirer.  
Banks that are smaller relative the acquirer are likely to be easier and lower cost to integrate 
into the acquirer. However, once the integration is complete, relatively larger targets may 
provide the acquirer with greater economies of scale. Relatively larger targets may also 
increase the chances that the post-merger banking organization will be considered 
‘too-big-to-fail.’ Consistent with lower costs of integration, significant negative coefficients on 
size are found by Benston, Hunter and Wall (1995), Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani (2007), 
Cheng, Gup and Wall (1989), Hakes, Brown and Rapport (1997) and Palia (1993). However, 
Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani (2000), Brewer and Jagtiani (2007) and Rogowski and 
Simonson (1989) obtain a positive coefficient. The estimated coefficient on relative asset 
size is insignificant in Díaz and Azofra (2009). 
Another potential cost of integration arises if there is a mismatch between the extent 
of business line diversification of acquirer and target.  The more dissimilar the two firms, 
the greater the potential for high integration costs. However, more dissimilar business lines 
may also provide greater opportunities for diversification gains. Díaz and Azofra (2009) use 
cluster analysis to group banks by product strategies and proxy diversification by whether 
the two banks are in the same product group. That paper estimates an insignificant 
coefficient on their diversification measure. 
 
                                                                            
7. A positive correlation would also be expected if banks in more concentrated markets can maintain their current level 
of profitability without increasing their risk. 
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2.4 Bank Regulation and Deposit Insurance 
The principle of minimum harmonization of regulation has led to different regulatory and 
supervisory requirements across EU member states. While EU Directives on solvency 
and depositor protection were mainly designed to prevent regulatory arbitrage on the basis 
of soundness and safety requirements, there continue to be differences across the EU as 
regards the costs of government regulation and deposit insurance [see Kane (2000); Carbó, 
Kane and Rodríguez (2008 and 2009)]. It is conceivable that acquirers pay more for targets 
with lower regulatory and deposit insurance costs. On the other hand, for cross-border 
mergers, stricter regulatory regimes may increase the bidder’s valuation of the target bank. 
This could be because, given the additional complexity that cross-border M&A entails, stricter 
regulators may increase the acquirer’s trust in the disclosure practices and the veracity of the 
financial condition of the target [Buch and DeLong (2004)]. 
Studies of domestic bank merger premiums in the U.S. cannot consider regulatory 
and deposit insurance costs because most of those costs are determined by federal policy. 
The U.S. has an incentive compatible mechanism for resolving small and medium-sized 
banks aimed at minimizing tax payers’ costs of resolving banks in crisis.8 Such ability 
has not been demonstrated for the largest U.S. banks with the result that many market 
participants believed some U.S. banks were ‘too-big-to-fail’ (TBTF).9
2.5 Investor Protection and Takeover Laws 
 Brewer and 
Jagtiani (2007) find evidence that acquirers pay more for deals that are likely to strengthen the 
impression that the post-merger organization is TBTF. 
The value that bidders assign to control over a target bank will depend on the bidder’s trust 
in the quality of the target’s disclosure practices as well as in the enforceability of the 
ownership rights which are being acquired. The legal protection of minority shareholders 
varies substantially across countries with wide-ranging implications for the development of 
financial systems and the design of corporate governance systems [LaPorta et al. (1998); 
Djankov et al. (2008)]. When investor protection is weak, insiders (managers and majority 
shareholders) enjoy more opportunities to expropriate minority shareholders and extract 
higher private benefits of control [Dyck and Zingales (2004)]. Rossi and Volpin (2004) and 
Bris and Cabolis (2008) show that takeover premiums increase under higher protection 
regimes and interpret this as evidence that investor protection increases activity in the market 
for corporate control. 
Studies of domestic bank takeover premiums in the U.S. do not consider investor 
protection rules, which are partly determined by federal standards and partly by state policies.  
Díaz and Azofra (2009) also do not consider investor protection. However, Hagendorff, Collins 
and Keasey (2008) analyze the impact of investor protection regimes in Europe and the U.S. 
on stock returns around bank takeover announcements. Their results indicate that 
bidding banks receive higher returns when the target is in a low investor protection country. 
This is consistent with target shareholders receiving a higher portion of any merger-related 
performance gains in countries with high investor protection. 
                                                                            
8. The U.S. banking literature has historically focused on size as a proxy for a bank’s importance to financial stability, 
thus, the focus in literature on ‘too-big-to-fail’ banks.  Most recently, many analysts have come to recognize that while 
size is correlated with a bank’s importance to financial stability, size per se is neither necessary nor sufficient for a bank 
to be systemically important. 
9. See Stern and Feldman (2004). 
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Finally, bank merger valuations may also reflect the extent to which takeover 
legislation requires premiums to be shared among equity holders. For listed firms, the EU 
Takeover Directive has introduced mandatory bid rules (MBRs) in most countries 
(see Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
takeover bids).10
                                                                            
10. See OJ L 142, 30.4.2004, pp. 12-23. 
 By requiring bidders to (i) tender for all remaining shares once they exceed 
a certain ownership threshold in the target and (ii) to pay a price based on when it passed the 
MBR threshold, MBRs protect minority shareholders from being squeezed into accepting a 
low premium once the transfer of the controlling block of voting rights has been completed 
[Nenova (2006)]. Since controlling shareholders in the target will be unable to attract the type 
of large premium that reflects their private benefits of control, MBRs are likely to lower their 
premiums, while increasing the premiums going to minority shareholders [see Dyck and 
Zingales (2004)]. The model in Díaz and Azofra (2009) includes the acquirer’s pre-acquisition 
ownership interest as a control for staggered takeovers. However, the model does not have 
any control for whether the acquisition triggers the MBR. 
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3 Empirical Strategy:  Data and Model  
3.1 The Sample 
We obtain the sample of European bank mergers from Thomson Financial’s M&A database. 
Deals are announced and completed between 1997 and 2007. Sample banks include 
commercial banks, mortgage and real estate banks, medium- and long-term credit banks, 
and bank holding companies which are chartered in the EU-25. We impose the following 
sampling criteria: The acquirer purchases at least 1% of the target’s equity. Thomson 
Financial reports the value of the acquisition. Sample banks are not subsidiaries of financial 
institutions chartered outside the EU. We eliminate share repurchases from our sample. 
Finally, target and bidder banks have accounting data available on Fitch IBCA’s Bankscope 
database. We ensured that accounting data are consistently reported in either International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or local accounting principles for every deal.11
We then applied the following data cleaning procedure to our initial sample: 
 
• We verified the deal characteristics from Thomson Financial (announcement 
date, offer price, deal value) against news articles from various sources on 
LexisNexis. Inconsistencies between the data obtained from Thomson Financial 
and the press coverage were corrected (this affected three transactions) or, if left 
unresolved, were omitted from our sample (this affected 19 deals). 
• We omit 11 distressed target banks. We delete deals where the press coverage 
surrounding a transaction indicates that the target was a failing institution or the 
book value premium paid by the target was smaller than -20%. 
• We omit a further three deals where the target was a government-owned 
institution and the deals more akin to privatization than bank mergers. 
• We delete six observations from our sample where the price paid by the acquirer 
was linked to the exercise of a call option on the target’s equity. In these cases, 
the takeover premium is likely to have been determined by factors prevailing 
at the time period the option was underwritten. 
 
The final sample contains 236 European bank acquisitions. A total of 143 of these 
involved listed targets and 74 were cross-border deals. We present an overview of the 
sample in Table 2. 
3.2 Takeover Premiums 
In order to compensate for the varying size of the target banks, most studies of bank merger 
pricing incorporate a measure of the pre-merger value of the target’s equity [Shawky, Kilb 
and Staas (1996); Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani (2000); Díaz et al. (2008)]. One such measure 
of the pre-merger equity is the target’s book value as of the last reporting period before the 
merger announcement. Although book values are imperfect measures of economic values, 
bank accounting values are likely to be closer to their economic value because both sides 
of banks’ balance sheets are dominated by short-term financial claims whose book value 
is likely to be close to its economic value. 
                                                                            
11. IFRS have been introduced after 2004 and apply only to listed banks in our sample. IFRS introduced the fair 
value treatment of a larger variety of bank assets. Hence, combining different accounting standards for one bank 
may cause severe measurement errors. For example, Barclays experienced a year-on-year increase in the value of total 
assets of 30% following the adoption of IFRS. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1011 
An alternative is to deflate by the market value of the target’s equity.  The advantage 
of a market measure of takeover pricing is that it incorporates the profitability of the target as 
it is currently being operated. One disadvantage is that it also incorporates investors’ estimate 
of the expected discounted value of the takeover premium. This component of the target’s 
stock price may be relatively large to the extent that the bank has long been regarded as a 
takeover target or to the extent that individuals with knowledge of the takeover discussions 
buy the target’s stock in anticipation of the takeover. Therefore, studies using market-based 
takeover premiums implicitly assume the takeover is a surprise and that the market 
believes the probability of being acquired is zero (or very low). In Europe, the presence of 
staggered takeovers limits the value of this assumption. Following the purchase of an 
initial toehold stake by the acquirer, the market value of target’s equity will reflect 
a substantial probability of future acquisitions. 
Another disadvantage is that market values are only available for publicly traded 
banks. The unavailability of takeover premium data for non-listed banks is an important issue, 
given the prominence of non-listed financial institutions as suppliers of banking services in the 
EU as well as their involvement in the consolidation of national banking sectors [see Goddard 
et al. (2007)]. Finally, a European study using market data of acquisition pricing needs to 
pool data from different stock markets of the EU. The lack of a single European stock 
market and the low levels of integration of existing stock markets in the EU [see ECB (2009)] 
mean that the comparability of market-based takeover premiums is inevitably impaired by the 
extent to which market values reflect differences in liquidity and the informational efficiency 
of asset prices across EU stock markets. 
Against this background, we measure bank merger premiums as the purchase 
Price paid for by the acquiring institution scaled by the pre-merger book value of the target 
bank’s equity.  We define the percentage book value premium (BVPREM) as  
deal valueBVPREM (%) = 1 100,
BV(equity)s
 
− × × 
   (1) 
where s is the equity stake purchased and the book value of equity refers to the fiscal year 
before the merger announcement supplied by Thomson Financial.   
3.3 Regulatory Data 
One of our aims is to investigate whether regulatory differences affect target valuations in 
bank takeovers. We measure regulatory differences using measures of regulatory strength, 
deposit insurance design, and the level of investor protection as summarized in Table 3. 
3.3.1 PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION (REGULATORY STRENGTH) 
We compile an index of regulatory and supervisory strength based on the Barth et al. (2001) 
database on global banking supervision. We follow Buch and DeLong (2008) and use 
this database to assemble a regulatory and supervisory strength index which reflects the 
adoption of twelve supervisory powers by national authorities. The index components 
are: banks disclose risk management procedures; risk-weights are in line with Basle 
guidelines; the capital–asset ratio varies with credit risk; the capital-asset ratio varies with 
market risk; there is a formal definition of ‘non-performing loan’ (these components are 
related to prudential regulatory strength); there are automatic mechanisms to sanction 
directors and managers; the supervisory agency can order directors/management to make 
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provisions to cover losses; the supervisory agency can suspend the distribution if dividends, 
bonuses, or management fees; the latter has been enforced in the past five years; 
the supervisory agency can declare a bank insolvent; the agency can suspend ownership 
rights of a problem bank; the supervisory agency (or any other government agency) 
can take measures aimed at bank restructuring and reorganization (these components are 
related  to the enforcement powers of supervisors). 
The regulatory strength index is an equally-weighted sum of these 12 indicators.12
3.3.2 DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
 
Consequently, the index varies between 0 and 12 with higher scores indicating that banking 
sectors exhibit stronger supervisory environments and better enforcement. 
We also measure the strength of the deposit insurance regime by assembling a deposit 
insurance index, based on the information reported by the member states. The index reflects 
if (i) insurance premiums are risk-based, and (ii) the deposit guarantee scheme is pre-funded. 
Consequently, the deposit insurance index varies between 0 and 2 with higher values 
indicating stricter, and to banks, more costly deposit insurance arrangements. 
3.3.3 INVESTOR PROTECTION 
We obtain an index of anti-director rights from La Porta et al. (1998) and, for updated values 
after 2003, from Djankov et al. (2008). The index measures the extent to which national laws 
protect minority shareholders from opportunistic behavior by managers. Specifically, it reflects 
the inclusion of six legal provisions as regards the voting rights that shareholder possess to 
influence director appointments and other major corporate issues. The index varies between 
0 and 6 by adding one when: shareholders can mail their proxy vote; there are no restrictions 
on selling shares prior to the time of shareholders’ meetings; there is proportional 
representation of minority shareholders on the board of directors; minority shareholders may 
require their shares to be bought back if in disagreement with major managerial initiatives 
(e.g. M&A, asset dispositions); an extraordinary shareholders' meeting can be called using 
10% or less of the share capital; shareholders have pre-emptive rights to new issues of 
equity. Higher values of this index show that a financial system is more shareholder-oriented 
— with possible implications for the valuation of bank mergers [see Hagendorff et al. (2008)]. 
In some countries, stricter enforcement of the existing legal provisions may partly 
substitute for weaker investor protection and vice versa [La Porta et al. (1998)]. To capture the 
quality of law enforcement, we follow Rossi and Volpin (2004) and multiply the anti-director 
index by an index of the rule of law. We use the rule of law index developed by the World 
Bank (which we rebase such that it varies between 0 and 10) to capture the efficiency of the 
judiciary and enforceability of contracts through the courts. We call the resulting index 
investor protection. 
                                                                            
12. Where the database lists more than one indicator for a single question, we assign an index value of one if at least half 
of the sub-questions apply. 
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4 Univariate Analysis   
In this section, we present preliminary results on some of the key drivers of target 
valuations in European bank mergers. We examine the price paid for control as well as 
regulation and other deal characteristics on the premiums paid in European bank mergers. 
4.1 Premiums Paid for Control  
In Section 2, we discussed the presence of a premium for control as well as the existence of 
MBR rules that protect minority shareholders in the target bank. Many (bank) M&A studies 
define control conservatively as the acquiring institution owning the majority of the voting 
equity in the target. In order to explore the threshold which bidding banks associate with a 
control transfer, Table 4 presents takeover premiums (BVPREM) at various control thresholds. 
We calculate mean and median BVPREM for deals which involve the bidder increasing its 
ownership in the target bank above 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50% or the MBR trigger. We use 
the MBRs which are applicable to the target country as reported in Nenova (2006). 
We observe that bidders pay a higher premium at each of these control thresholds. 
The median differences in BVPREM are statistically significant for each of the threshold 
portfolios defined above. Further, the premium differences appear to be particularly large at 
the 30% ownership level.13
This seems to indicate that, while bidders price in a control transfer at various 
ownership stakes, a premium for control over a target is likely to be paid at ownership 
levels much lower than 50%. A control threshold of less than 50% is consistent with IFRS 
accounting rules as well as the minimum threshold for authorization by EU prudential 
supervisors (see Directive 2007 / 44/ CE of the European Parliament). Both accounting 
and supervisory rules in the EU have set a 20% ownership level for disclosure and 
authorization purposes, respectively. 
 
4.2 Regulation and Other Deal Characteristics 
Table 5 presents acquisition premiums for different types of bank acquisitions. The results 
show that regulation affects takeover pricing in European bank mergers. On the one hand, 
stricter regulation may facilitate due diligence for bidders and increase their trust in the 
quality of the target’s disclosure practices as well as in the soundness of the target bank in 
general. On the other hand, stronger regulatory regimes impose higher compliance costs 
on bidding banks and, in the case of bank regulation, may well restrict managerial discretion 
— with potential implications for bank profitability in the post-merger period. 
The results in Table 5 show acquirers pay lower premiums for banks in countries 
with better protection of minority shareholders. This difference is substantial in absolute 
terms and statistically significant both for both average and median premiums (below 1%). 
Similarly, bidders pay lower premiums for banks in countries where the strength of the bank 
regulatory regime is below the EU median (mean and median premium differences are 
statistically significant at 10% and 11%, respectively). Along similar lines, stricter deposit 
                                                                            
13. In unreported tests, we also analyze the premiums linked to staggered bank acquisitions. Acquisitions are staggered 
when purchases of bank shares take place in a series of transactions.  In our sample, 33 acquisitions involved more 
than one transaction (typically two) between the same acquirer and target. In most cases (23), the acquirer ultimately 
bought 100% of the target’s equity during the sampling period. We find that the highest premiums in staggered deals 
are paid for deals in which the bidding banks increases its ownership above 20%. However, we do not find that the 
premium differences between lower and higher control thresholds are statistically significant at customary levels. 
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insurance arrangements (in terms of the funding and risk-based premiums) also mean that 
investors pay lower premiums (albeit premium differences are statistically significant at 12%). 
These results are consistent with the explanation that regulation entails costs for the bidding 
bank that seem to outweigh any benefits that stricter regulatory frameworks bring about in 
terms of investor protection and banks´ safety and soundness. 
Further, Table 5 shows that cross-border deals do not fetch a lower premium over 
domestic deals. This is somewhat surprising, given the more pronounced potential to cut 
costs in domestic mergers and the increased costs of cross-cultural and cross-regulatory 
differences that are linked to bank merger across borders [Buch and DeLong (2004)]. 
However, for a number of acquirers from markets with already concentrated banking 
sectors, particularly in small countries, there is little alternative to consolidation across borders 
[see Berglöf et al. (2005)]. 
Finally, one of the advantages of our book value-based measure of 
takeover premiums is that we can also include a wider range of banking firms than listed 
banks. Listed banks have higher disclosure requirements which may facilitate effective due 
diligence and could prevent bidders from overpaying for targets.14
                                                                            
14. Experienced buyers of private firms should be expected to learn about the problems in valuing privately held buyers 
and, in a large sample, we would not expect experienced buyers on average to overpay. However, many banks have 
limited experience buying other banks and may not fully appreciate the added difficulties posed by buying a privately 
owned bank. 
 On the other hand, 
the market for corporate control for listed targets should be more liquid and any resulting 
bidding contests are likely to drive up acquisition premiums. The results in Table 5 show 
that the premiums paid in European bank acquisitions do not vary by whether the target bank 
is listed or not. 
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5 Regressions  
5.1 Specification 
To analyze the factors that determine target bank valuations in a multivariate setting, 
we estimate the following regression model with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors: 
 
1 2BVPREM (%) =  + DC+ TC+ REGULAT + ,α β β γ ε   (2) 
 
where DC a vector of deal characteristics, 
TC is a vector of target bank characteristics, and  
REGULAT includes regulatory variables. 
 
 
The deal characteristics include the following variables. CONTROL is a dummy 
variable indicating whether the deal involves a change in shareholder control of the target 
bank. Following Hernando, Nieto and Wall (2009), we assume that a change in control takes 
place when a non-listed bank that owns less than 20% of the target equity increases its 
shareholding to at least 20%. For listed banks, CONTROL is one when a bank with an initial 
stake in the target below the MBR (as applicable to the target country) reaches that threshold 
after the transaction has been completed. CROSSB is a dummy variable that is one if bidder 
and target are chartered in different countries (and zero otherwise). Market concentration in 
the target country is measured by a Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) where the market 
is defined as the country in which the bank is headquartered.15
We include the following target bank characteristics. Return on equity (ROE) is the 
average for the three years preceding a deal and the riskiness of the target (RISK) is proxied 
by the standard deviation of ROE in the pre-merger years.
 All else equal, more 
concentrated markets may afford higher rents to banking firms which would consequently be 
prepared to pay higher premiums for acquisitions in more concentrated banking markets 
[Palia (1993)]. Growth opportunities are proxied with the annual growth rate of the target 
country’s gross domestic product (TGDPGROWTH). The expected sign on this variable 
is positive since growing target markets should offer acquirers increased profit potential. 
RELSIZE measures the combined bidder and target assets divided by bidder total assets. 
We employ this measure as an indicator of the easiness to integrate the target unit. 
16
                                                                            
15. Yearly values of HHI are calculated according to a common methodology as explained in ECB (2006, Annex 2). 
 We expect higher values of ROE 
and lower levels of RISK to attract higher takeover premiums. Leverage (LEV) is the 
equity-to-assets ratio in the fiscal year before the acquisition announcement. This definition of 
leverage accords with the bank supervisory use of the term and contrasts with a common 
definition of leverage in the corporate finance literature (where equity is the denominator as 
in the debt-to-equity ratio or the assets-to-equity ratio). Following Benston et al. (1995), 
we measure potential diversification benefits by the covariance of ROE for bidder and target 
banks in the pre-merger years (COVROE). A negative sign on this variable would indicate 
that bidders pay more for targets with greater potential to smooth earnings. 
16. We have also used other measures of profitability (ROA) and efficiency (cost-to-income ratio) which did not enter the 
model with a statistically significant coefficient when included in the regression together with ROE. However, ROE kept 
its statistical significance in the absence and presence of both ROA and the cost-to-income ratio. 
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Based on Laeven and Levine (2007), we compute an asset-based measure of how 
focused banks are on lending as 1-|(net loans-other earning assets)/total earning assets|. 
ASSETDIV is the absolute value of the difference of this ratio for bidders and targets. Bidders 
may be willing to pay larger premiums for banks that generate large shares of non-lending 
related income (e.g fee, dividends and trading income) rather than taking deposits and 
making loans. TAGRWTH is an asset-based growth measure over three years. A positive 
sign on the growth variable would indicate a valuation premium associated with targets 
operating in expanding markets. Finally, we capture the type of business specialization 
of target banks as supplied by Bankscope. We distinguish between commercial banks 
(COMMERCIAL), medium and long term (investment) banks (INVEST) and holding company 
banks (HOLDING).17
5.2 Results: Target and Deal Characteristics 
 
Table 6 shows the results of regressions of deal and target bank characteristics on BVPREM. 
The first column reports the results for the whole sample, while we report the results for the 
subsample of listed targets in the second column. The third column reports the p-values of 
tests for differences between the coefficients estimated for the full results and the sub-sample 
of listed targets. 
We find that higher target profitability (ROE) and lower target leverage (LEV) are 
associated with higher premiums. The magnitude of these effects is non-negligible. For the full 
sample (listed sub-sample), a 1 percentage point increase in ROE is associated with a 2.13% 
(7.71%) increase in the average premium paid. The larger effect found for listed targets 
(which is statistically significant at 2%) may be explained by two factors. First, the stricter 
transparency requirements imposed on listed companies (in terms of the schedule and 
content of the audit of their financial statements) makes their profitability data more 
reliable from the view point of the acquirer. Second, when bank equity is publicly traded, 
there will be more competition for takeover targets and highly-performing targets are most 
likely to be subject to bidding contests that drive up premiums. 
Further, acquirers pay less for targets that are riskier (RISK), but more for targets 
whose ROE exhibits a higher covariance (COV) with their own profitability. The results for 
these two variables appear contradictory, with acquirers paying less for the target’s own risk 
but more for covariance. Perhaps RISK or COV are actually serving as proxies for something 
other than risk. For example, COV could be a better proxy for the extent to which the acquirer 
and target have similar operations than our other measures of similarity. The positive and 
(weakly) significant coefficient on target growth found for the full sample indicates that 
acquirer value fast-growing target banks. 
Finally, the effects of deal characteristics on European takeover premiums are far 
from conclusive. For the full sample, the only significant coefficient is the cross-border dummy 
(CROSSB). The negative coefficient reported is consistent with bidders facing greater 
operational difficulties to integrate foreign banks. The coefficients of the remaining deal 
characteristics are not statistically significant. Deals involving a change in control, thus, do not 
result in higher premiums than those observed in purchases of minority stakes (even though 
the coefficient has the expected positive sign). Similarly, takeover premiums are neither 
related to the legal status of the target (listed vs. unlisted) nor to the degree of market 
concentration (HHI) or the GDP growth (TGDPGROWTH) in the host country. Further, we do 
                                                                            
17. This paper does not include the medium of payment in acquisitions (equity versus cash) because our data source 
appears to contain some errors. 
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not observe a significant relationship between relative size (RELSIZE) and target valuations. 
Finally, differences in the degree to which the merging banks engage in lending (ASSETDIV) 
are not related to takeover premiums.18
5.3 Results: Regulation and Takeover Premiums 
 
Table 7 reports the results of regressions that estimate the impact of the regulatory variables 
for investor protection, deposit insurance, and regulatory strength on the takeover premiums 
paid in European banking. 
Concerning the results for the regulatory variables, we do not find a significant effect 
for the shareholder protection proxy neither for the full sample nor for the listed subsample. 
However, we obtain negative coefficients for both the deposit insurance and the regulatory 
strength indices. Both measures are significant for the sample of listed targets, while the 
deposit insurance proxy is also statistically significant for the full sample (p-value=0.10). 
The negative relationship between takeover premiums and the regulatory indices is 
consistent both with banks seeking weaker insurance and regulatory systems to exploit 
the safety net and with higher compliance costs resulting from stronger regulatory regimes 
and risk-based and pre-funded deposit insurance. 
It is interesting to note that the inclusion of regulatory variables into our regression 
model leaves most of the findings from previous regression specifications unchanged. 
The estimated coefficients on the risk (RISK) and return (ROE) variables suggest that acquirers 
are willing to pay higher premiums for more profitable and lower premiums for riskier 
institutions. In turn, the target growth term (TARGRWTH) is only significant for the full sample. 
Interestingly, the quadratic asset growth term (TARGRWTHSQ) is negative and statistically 
significant. This result indicates decreasing marginal benefits to growth. In fact, three-year 
asset growth rates above 47% cause the effect of this variable on BVPREM to be negative. 
As regards the coefficients on the deal characteristics, we find some differences with 
respect to the results reported in Table 6. For the full sample, the cross-border dummy 
(CROSSB) is no longer significant. The mandatory bid rule (MBR) defines the ownership 
threshold at which the bidder is obliged to make a tender offer to all shareholders. 
The CONTROL dummy (which is defined in terms of the MBR for listed banks) enters the 
regression with a positive and significant coefficient suggesting that mandatory bid rules 
increase the cost of takeovers for listed targets. 
Finally, Table 8 shows the results of the estimation of a specification which allows 
for a differential effect of the regulatory variables depending on whether the deal is domestic 
or cross-border.19
                                                                            
18. When we replace the ASSETDIV variable with a binary variable that captures if the business specialization between 
the merging banks is different, this new variable turns out to be also non-significant. 
 The estimated coefficients for both target and deal characteristics are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 7. However, the coefficient estimates of the 
regulatory variables provide interesting insights. In the case of listed banks, we find that 
the estimated coefficients on both the regulatory strength and the deposit insurance 
indices are negative and significant, while the corresponding interaction terms are positive 
and significant. In the full sample, the interaction terms are also positive albeit not statistically 
significant. There is no indication that the interaction effects are statistically different for listed 
19. We have also estimated a specification which allows for a differential effect of the regulatory variables depending 
on whether the target banks belongs to a Member State that has joined the EU since 2004 (e.g., Hungary, Poland).  
We do not find any differential effect as all the interaction terms are insignificant. Nevertheless, this result might be driven 
by the small number of targets of those countries. 
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banks and for the full sample. These results echo the univariate analysis above and suggest 
that in the case of domestic deals, stricter regulatory regimes as well as stronger deposit 
insurance arrangements impose higher compliance costs on acquirers that are reflected in 
lower premiums. However, in the case of cross-border deals, these regulatory costs are 
compensated by the potential benefits associated with entry into a market with a stricter 
regulatory framework.20 This is consistent with Buch and DeLong (2004) who argue that 
stricter regulation makes targets more attractive in cross-border deals as a result of increased 
trust in the target bank’s disclosure practices.21
                                                                            
20. The estimated effects for the regulatory strength and for the deposit insurance variables in the case of cross-border 
deals are not significantly different from zero. In particular, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the sum of the 
coefficients on the regulatory strength index and the corresponding interaction term is zero (the p-values for the full 
sample and for listed banks are 0.88 and 0.34, respectively). Analogously, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the sum 
of the coefficients on the deposit insurance index and the corresponding interaction term is zero (the p-values are 0.57 
for the full sample and 0.92 for listed targets). 
 
21. We further analyse whether the interaction effects differ by whether a target is located in an equally strict (or stricter) 
regulatory environment or, alternatively, in a less strict environment relative to the bidding bank (both in terms of 
regulatory strength and deposit insurance). We find no evidence that takeover pricing reflects the direction of regulatory 
differences (stricter / less strict) in cross-border deals. When we include the new interaction variables, the non-interacted 
regulatory variables (DEP_INS and REG_STRENGTH) maintain their negative sign and their statistical significance in 
all specifications. 
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6 Conclusions and Policy Considerations 
A substantial body of research has examined the patterns and performance of bank mergers 
and acquisitions. To date, this literature has largely focused on the U.S. with only limited 
evidence outside the U.S. market and very few studies which have examined Europe. 
While M&A has transformed the size of banking firms and widened the scope of activities they 
perform in a number of European economies, policymakers have long been concerned 
that the hitherto slow pace at which bank consolidation takes place in Europe (especially 
cross-border bank consolidation) runs contrary to the Single Market policy of the EU. 
In this paper, we analyze the premiums paid in European bank mergers. By analyzing the 
premiums paid by bidding banks, we are able to draw some conclusions as to the motives 
behind bank M&A in Europe. The EU offers a unique setting to analyze the extent to 
which regulatory considerations motivate M&A and are, thus, reflected in the pricing of bank 
acquisitions. This is mainly because high levels of freedom of capital movement coexist in the 
EU with continuing regulatory differences in the areas of bank regulation, deposit insurance, 
and investor protection regimes. 
Our results show that bidding banks value more profitable and high-growth banks, 
and pay less for institutions with high equity ratios and high return volatility. In addition, 
bidders attach a valuation premium to focusing mergers that generate greater shareholder 
value. We also find that stricter prudential regulatory regimes and stronger deposit insurance 
schemes lower the takeover premiums paid in bank mergers. This result may reflect an 
attempt to gain greater safety net subsidies or it may reflect concern about higher compliance 
costs. In either case, the result seems to be mainly driven by domestic deals. On the whole, 
we find no conclusive evidence consistent with bidders paying to extract benefits from 
regulators either by paying a premium for less regulated regimes or becoming ‘too big to fail’ 
in cross-border deals. 
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Table 1. Bank merger premium studies 
 
Paper Sample Time period 
Premium 
measure 
Adkisson and Fraser (1990) 174 U.S. takeovers 1985-1986 Book value 
Beatty, Santomero and Smirlock 264 U.S. takeovers 1984-1985 Book value 
Benston, Hunter and Wall (1995)   302 U.S. takeovers 1981-1986 Market value 
Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani, (2000) 189 U.S. takeovers 1990-1998 Book value 
Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani, (2007) 392 U.S. takeovers 1990-2004 Market value 
Brewer and Jagtiani, (2007) 412 U.S. takeovers 1991-2004 Market value 
Cheng, Gup and Wall (1989) 135 U.S. takeovers 1981-1986 Book value 
Diaz and Azofra (2009) 147 EU takeovers 1994-2000 Book value 
Palia (1993) 137 U.S. takeovers 1984-1987 Book value 
Rogowski and Simonson 168 U.S. takeovers 1984-1987 Book value 
Shawky, Kilb and Staas (1996) 320 U.S. takeovers 1982-1990 Book value 
 
 
   
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 29 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1011 
Breakdown by country
Full sample Deals with listed target
Cross-border 
deals
Austria 7 5 3
Belgium 3 1 2
Czech Republic 6 4 5
Denmark 7 5 3
Estonia 3 3 2
Finland 1 1
France 22 18 4
Germany 22 14 8
Greece 15 12 4
Hungary 3 1 2
Ireland 2 2 2
Italy 75 33 7
Latvia 3 2 3
Lithuania 5 5 2
Luxembourg 1 1 1
Malta 3 3 3
Netherlands 2 1
Poland 9 6 7
Portugal 9 7 1
Slovak Republic 4 4
Slovenia 4 4 3
Spain 23 13 4
Sweden 1
United Kingdom 6 4 2
Breakdown by year
1997 16 12 1
1998 32 16 9
1999 34 27 9
2000 35 25 11
2001 23 14 8
2002 14 7 7
2003 23 10 6
2004 19 8 6
2005 10 5 5
2006 20 11 10
2007 10 8 2
Total 236 143 74
Table 2. Number of deals
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Regulatory 
strength
Deposit 
insurance
Austria 9 1 19.3
Belgium 9 1 8.0
Czech Republic 7 1 2.9
Denmark 6 1 19.8
Estonia 8 1 .
Finland 8 2 31.0
France 4 2 24.6
Germany 4 2 20.0
Greece 4 1 12.8
Hungary 9 1 13.3
Ireland 9 1 36.6
Italy 5 1 9.0
Latvia 5 1 21.5
Lithuania 3 1 23.1
Luxembourg 7 0 17.8
Malta 8 1 .
Netherlands 5 0 21.2
Poland 8 1 12.2
Portugal 6 2 21.2
Slovak Republic 7 1 0.9
Slovenia 9 0 .
Spain 7 1 32.0
Sweden 3 2 25.8
United Kingdom 9 0 42.4
Sample Median 7 1 19.975
Shareholder protection 
(country avg -1997-2007)
Table 3. Bank regulatory indices
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Mean Median N. obs.
No 138.8 92.3 91
Yes 162.0 122.6 145
Difference -23.1 -30.3 *
No 141.9 91.9 83
Yes 159.1 122.6 153
Difference -17.3 -30.7 **
No 135.6 88.5 88
Yes 163.4 125.7 148
Difference -27.8 -37.3 **
No 149.1 92.9 93
Yes 155.6 123.1 143
Difference -6.6 -30.2 **
No 161.9 92.6 92
Yes 147.4 122.6 144
Difference 14.6 -30.0 **
No 142.5 92.6 90
Yes 159.6 122.6 146
Difference -17.1 -30.0 **
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Control 
(threshold: 30%)
Control 
(threshold: 40%)
Control 
(threshold: MBR)
Control 
(threshold: 50%)
Control 
(threshold: 10%)
Control 
(threshold: 20%)
Table 4. Bank acqusition premiums (BVPREM), by control thresholds
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Mean Median N. obs.
Below median 183.1 131.8 137
Above median 111.5 76.2 99
Difference 71.6 *** 55.5 ***
Below median 168.0 111.0 161
Above median 120.9 85.1 75
Difference 47.1 * 25.9
0 or 1 151.7 118.6 181
2 157.6 76.2 55
Difference -6.0 42.3
Domestic 147.5 109.6 162
Cross border 165.2 100.2 74
Difference -17.7 9.4
No 148.8 122.0 93
Yes 155.8 98.3 143
Difference -7.1 23.8
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Shareholder 
protection
Geographical 
scope
Listed
Regulatory 
strength
Deposit 
insurance
Table 5. Bank acquisition premiums (BVPREM), by deal characteristics
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Ho: Full sample=listed
(p-value)
CONTROL 22.219 28.49 (0.57)
CROSSB -39.993* -6.66 (0.80)
HHI 0.027 0.027 (0.20)
LISTED -29.872 - -
ROE 2.127*** 7.705*** (0.02)
RISK -1.990*** -1.752*** (0.60)
LEV -4.567*** -4.669** (0.62)
COVROE 0.825** 1.590** (0.60)
ASSETDIV 6.278 93.949 (0.17)
RELSIZE 9.911 17.72 (0.99)
TAGRWTH 2.915* -3.452 (0.00)
TAGRWTHSQ -0.044 0.034 (0.01)
TGDPGROWTH -0.567 -4.869 (0.96)
COMMERCIAL 7.074 35.346 (0.40)
HOLDING -85.467 -11.958 (0.04)
INVESTMENT -62.223 -70.311 (1.00)
INTERCEPT 143.755** 29.195 (0.02)
N 175 103
r2_a 0.068 0.179
rmse 140.623 134.375
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6. Determinants of the premiums paid:  Financial variables
Variable Full sample Listed 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is the premium of the purchase price over the book value in 
percentages.  The full sample column contains all observations in the sample; the listed 
column contains those where the target is listed on a stock exchange.  The independent 
variables are:  CONTROL = binary variable equal to 1 if the deal involves a change in 
shareholder control of the target bank, CROSSB = binary variable equal to 1 if the bidder 
and target are chartered in different countries, HHI = Hirschman-Herfindahl index where 
the market is defined as the country in which the bank is headquartered, LISTED = binary 
variable equal to 1 if the target is listed on a stock exchange, ROE = return on equity, RISK 
= standard deviation of return on equity, LEV = equity divided by total assets, COVROE = 
covariance of ROE for bidder and target banks in the pre-merger years, ASSETDIV = 
absolute value of (1-|(net loans-other earning assets)/total earning assets) (from Laeven 
and Levine (2007)), RELSIZE = sum of bidder and target assets divided by bidder total 
assets, TAGRWTH = growth rate in target assets measure over the prior three years, 
TAGRWTHSQ = TAGRWTH squared. The third column reports p-values of difference in 
coefficients tests. 
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Ho: Full sample=listed
(p-value)
CONTROL 29.95 54.589* (0.89)
CROSSB -32.747 25.697 (0.69)
HHI 0.028 0.045 (0.14)
LISTED -27.594 - -
ROE 2.090*** 9.093*** (0.01)
RISK -1.841*** -1.772** (0.44)
LEV -5.613*** -6.532*** (0.64)
COVROE 0.942** 1.936** (0.54)
ASSETDIV 25.794 91.622 (0.32)
RELSIZE 13.068 13.335 (0.91)
TAGRWTH 3.908** -2.819 (0.02)
TAGRWTHSQ -0.083*** -0.031 (0.30)
TGDPGROWTH 4.043 4.67 (0.52)
SHPROTECT -1.143 -1.819 (0.73)
DEP_INS -41.910* -45.479* (0.98)
REG_STRENGTH -14.47 -30.279** (0.41)
COMMERCIAL 0.466 29.402 (0.63)
HOLDING -104.697 -2.958 (0.06)
INVESTMENT -63.964 -101.188 (0.69)
INTERCEPT 279.197*** 246.200** (0.03)
N 168 96
r2_a 0.104 0.299
rmse 135.779 121.139
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 7. Determinants of the premiums paid:  Financial and 
regulatory variables
Variable Full sample Listed 
 
 
Notes:  Dependent variable is the premium of the purchase price over the book value in 
percentages.  The full sample column contains all observations in the sample; the listed 
column contains those where the target is listed on a stock exchange.  The independent 
variables are:  CONTROL = binary variable equal to 1 if the deal involves a change in 
shareholder control of the target bank, CROSSB = binary variable equal to 1 if the bidder 
and target are chartered in different countries, HHI = Hirschman-Herfindahl index where 
the market is defined as the country in which the bank is headquartered, LISTED = binary 
variable equal to 1 if the target is listed on a stock exchange, ROE = return on equity, RISK 
= standard deviation of return on equity, LEV = equity divided by total assets, COVROE = 
covariance of ROE for bidder and target banks in the pre-merger years, ASSETDIV = 
absolute value of (1-|(net loans-other earning assets)/total earning assets) (from Laeven 
and Levine (2007)), RELSIZE = sum of bidder and target assets divided by bidder total 
assets, TAGRWTH = growth rate in target assets measure over the prior three years, 
TAGRWTHSQ = TAGRWTH squared. The third column reports p-values of difference in 
coefficients tests. 
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Notes:  Dependent variable is the premium of the purchase price over the book value in 
percentages.  The full sample column contains all observations in the sample; the listed 
column contains those where the target is listed on a stock exchange.  The independent 
variables are:  CONTROL = binary variable equal to 1 if the deal involves a change in 
shareholder control of the target bank, CROSSB = binary variable equal to 1 if the bidder 
and target are chartered in different countries, HHI = Hirschman-Herfindahl index where 
the market is defined as the country in which the bank is headquartered, LISTED = binary 
variable equal to 1 if the target is listed on a stock exchange, ROE = return on equity, RISK 
= standard deviation of return on equity, LEV = equity divided by total assets, COVROE = 
covariance of ROE for bidder and target banks in the pre-merger years, ASSETDIV = 
absolute value of (1-|(net loans-other earning assets)/total earning assets) (from Laeven 
and Levine (2007)), RELSIZE = sum of bidder and target assets divided by bidder total 
assets, TAGRWTH = growth rate in target assets measure over the prior three years, 
TAGRWTHSQ = TAGRWTH squared. The third column reports p-values of difference in 
coefficients tests. 
Ho: Full sample=listed
(p-value)
CONTROL 30.92 51.933* (0.81)
CROSSB -265.905 -298.088* (0.83)
HHI 0.029 0.051 (0.14)
LISTED -27.271 - -
ROE 1.950** 8.452*** (0.01)
RISK -1.886*** -2.021*** (0.15)
LEV -5.833*** -7.089*** (0.76)
COVROE 0.825* 1.935** (0.61)
ASSETDIV 17.121 76.99 (0.37)
RELSIZE 13.095 16.189 (0.93)
TAGRWTH 3.047* -3.91 (0.02)
TAGRWTHSQ -0.060** 0.002 (0.25)
TGDPGROWTH 4.824 8.666 (0.33)
SHPROTECT 0.718 0.813 (0.65)
SHPROTECT*CROSSB -2.368 -4.232 (0.26)
DEP_INS -76.526* -95.661** (0.94)
DEP_INS*CROSSB 61.301 99.777* (0.86)
REG_STRENGTH -36.889* -61.154** (0.36)
REG_STRENGTH*CROSSB 35.247 47.712* (0.55)
COMMERCIAL 9.814 21.158 (0.76)
HOLDING -90.635 -22.207 (0.22)
INVESTMENT -49.647 -100.697 (0.70)
INTERCEPT 405.083*** 437.918*** (0.06)
N 168 96
r2_a 0.105 0.308
rmse 135.672 120.359
p-values (Reg.var+interaction)
t_sharehol~v 0.30 0.15
t_di 0.57 0.92
t_regul_st~h 0.88 0.34
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 8. Determinants of the premiums paid:  Financial and regulatory 
variables - Interactions
Variable Full sample Listed 
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